istock.com

The biological arsenal that could be used for harm against humanity has an almost limitless supply of weaponry, thanks to nature's own talent for creating infectious agents of destruction.

"Is Mother Nature the best bioterrorist?" proposed David Relman, MD, professor of medicine and of microbiology and immunology in the School of Medicine, in a seminar April 16, 2008 for the Center for International Security and Cooperation. The center is an interdisciplinary research and training group at Stanford, part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, that tackles worldwide security issues and develops advice to governments and international organizations.

A focus of Relman's research is characterizing the microbial communities that live within human bodies, and how these communities interact to both promote health and cause disease. His fascination with the duality of science has spawned another interest: the inherent possibility that scientific advances could be used for evil in the form of a terrorist attack using biological agents.

"This is not what I spend the vast majority of my professional time on, but it intrigues me," said Relman, who is also chief of the infectious diseases section at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System. "I don't profess to have the answers, but I have some thoughts."

As a member of the U.S. Health and Human Services Department's National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity for the last three years, Relman emphasizes boosting research to understand the biology of potential threats rather than focusing on specific countermeasures to known threats. The question remains: Is this a bunch of hype or is there grounds for real concern?

Relman leans toward the latter. "From the perspective of a biologist, the agents are already available in nature," he said. "We have to assume this is not a major obstacle."

Biological warfare isn't new; it has been around for centuries, Relman said. In 14th-century Eastern Europe, for example, the Tatar army catapulted plague-infested corpses at their enemies from Italy in the port city of Caffa on the Black Sea.

In recent years, he pointed out, anthrax has already been used against people on a small scale. Smallpox and strains of influenza could be deadly if these agents could be "weaponized"—able to be released with deadly consequences under real-world conditions.

"I can't tell you how many times I have heard: 'Can't we just regulate this problem by setting boundaries on the reagents and equipment?'" he said. "This is just not going to work. The information is everywhere."

For example, Relman noted that DNA sequencers are readily available on eBay for starting bids as low as $199, as are kits to amplify DNA. In addition, recent scientific publications show how tinkering with genes can alter qualities of micro-organisms such that they can become more virulent or able to infect multiple hosts.

Relman doesn't object to the widespread availability of genetic tools, however. "Don't get me wrong, this is a good thing" that science is advancing its capabilities, he said. "I am the beneficiary of this way more than any bioterrorist." But the point remains that the means and the methods of these advances are available to craft biological agents of terror.

Relman's conclusions rest on the idea that the inherent good side and bad side of the life sciences must be acknowledged, and regulators must strive to find a balance between biosecurity and academic and scientific freedom. "Regulation hasn't done much so far except antagonized the infectious disease researchers, exactly those you want to be on your side," he said.

The bottom line is that a sound defense is a good offense, he said. "We always tend to fight the last war," he said. "But the next bioterrorism event may not look anything like the last." He added that the nation needs a public health infrastructure that is flexible, agile and swift to deal with any outbreak or intentional release of an infectious agent.